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Democracy in the Non-West: Facts, Fictions and Frictions 
DR NITASHA KAUL 
Introduction 
Political systems, like other social institutions, are products of time and 
place. Democracy is one such system, one of many. Human history is as 
much a story of better or worse, as it is of more or less power - there is 
nothing more constant than change and nothing more potent in 
affecting change than the creation of teleological narratives which make 
the past seem inevitably to lead to the present and the present seem a 
mere stage in progression on to a future whose promise was ingrained 
in the past all along. In other words, when we tell the story of history 
(in a Whiggish manner) as a progressive dialectical unfolding - we are 
ignoring the necessary counterfactuals, the discontinuities. Let me 
explain. 
 
In our times, the discourse of democracy by the end of the 20th century 
has acquired a universalist ethos and become associated with modernist 
notions of Progress and Popular representation. It is the ideal type 
against which the non-democratic systems are judged, evaluated and 
mostly found lacking. Moreover, there is a popular association of 
democracy with the West. The standard narrative of democracy, that 
begins with the ancient Athenian assemblies and is traced to the 
modern emergence of the West with the Enlightenment fostered 
political changes in Britain, France and over time the free-world domain 
with America at its head, is flawed for many reasons. 
 
For the purpose of the discussion here, we need to be aware of 
assumptions, myths and forgettings through which „democratic West‟ is 
imagined by its proponents as well as critics. This is because the biggest 
fiction around about democracy is that democracy emerged in the West 
(starting with ancient classical Greeks and later British parliamentary 
system) and then spread to the non-West through different waves of 
democratisation. Even though a range of scholarship has challenged 
this myth, for instance by pointing out to the Afro-Asiatic roots of the 
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Classical Greeks (Bernal‟s Black Athena) or the polyvalence of 
democracies as done recently by my colleague John Keane in The Life 
and Death of Democracy1, the fiction of democratic West as a natural 
category which can then export democracy persists. 
 
It forgets how the democratic West till recently did not see a 
contradiction between democracy within and exploitation, racism, and 
authoritarian rule abroad in their colonies. It forgets that ingenious 
experiments with violence to discipline, control, punish and 
exterminate subjected populations was not only a characteristic of non-
democratic Western powers (say the genocide of Herero and Nama 
peoples by Germans in South West Africa at the start of the 20th 
century)2 but also of democratic Western states (for example, the first 
concentration camps set up by the British during the Boer Wars in 
South Africa3, or Churchill‟s exasperation at the „squeamishness‟ to use 
„poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes‟ of Iraqi Arabs and Kurds - see 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHU407A.html - or extensive 
use of torture by the French in Algeria). The only reason I mention these 
historical instances is to remind ourselves the chequered history 
through which democracies have emerged as well as functioned. 
Without going into the intricacies of the „democratic peace‟ debate (the 
contestable idea that democracies do not go to war with each other in 
general), a study of history shows that there is no necessary connection 
between democratic political system within and a more peaceful foreign 
policy outside (see Rosato 2003). 
 
The naturalisation of „democratic West‟ today works by paying only 
tokenistic recognition to the revolutionary antecedents (for instance in 
                                                          
1 Keane (2009) provides a comprehensive history of democracy, tracing three 
epochs - the period from 2500 BCE to 900 CE as the age of assemblies, the next 
ten centuries as the ascendancy of  representative democracy, and the present 
as the beginning of an era of „monitory democracy‟. 
2 In the period 1904 to 1907, tens of thousands of Herero and Nama people of 
what is now Namibia were exterminated (starvation, poisoning) by German 
generals as they revolted against German colonial rule. 
3 During the second Boer war (1899-1902) Kitchener instituted these camps, 
which included women and children. The Combat policies included scorched 
earth, poisoning water sources etc. 
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France or the United States), violent defeats (for example in Germany 
and Japan), gradualist compromises (Britain), or anti-colonial struggles 
(Ireland) through, in summary, the numerous struggles through which 
ordinary people forced the elite to share power. It ignores the 
corruption of democratic systems in the West through money, politics 
of fear, and a culture of conformity. The well-recognised and oft-
commented upon practices of gerrymandering, pork barrelling, 
lobbying in the United States of America are often seen as inevitable. A 
recent survey of economists (Davis and Figgins 2009) across the range 
of political affiliations (democrat, republican and libertarian members 
of the America Economic Association)4 reveals that they have no great 
confidence in American democracy. The authors suggest that an 
appropriate story line for describing the survey results might read as 
follows: 
 
Politics in America: A place where special interest groups exert 
influence over politicians who use creative public discourse with 
economically incompetent or ignorant voters in an effort to be re-
elected, and where the eventual policy consequences are often not 
beneficial, except to special interests and politicians.  
 
We have similar examples of corrupt practices in democracies 
elsewhere, as the 2009 Expenses scandal in the British Parliament 
revealed. Yet, there seems to be no strong will to bring about a change 
to the corruptions of the practices, what is often called „democratic 
deficit‟, in the established democracies5. For the most part, the 
                                                          
4 See Davis and Figgins (2009: 3) for details: The survey was mailed to 1000 
randomly-chosen members of the American Economic Association in late April 
of 2006. The survey was pre-tested among a small number of economists to 
assess the appropriateness of each proposition, minimise bias or ambiguity, and 
maximise response rate. Over an eight-week period, 302 completed surveys 
(and 87 undeliverable surveys) were returned, yielding a response rate of 33 
percent, similar to many other surveys of AEA members. Of the 302 
respondents: 87% were male, 13% female. 65% employed as university faculty, 
13% in government, 11% in business or industry, 11% other. 47% received their 
highest degree prior to (or in) 1980, 53% after (or in) 1981. 
5 A short-hand definition online: “A democratic deficit is considered to be 
occurring when ostensibly democratic organisations or institutions (particularly 
governments) are seen to be falling short of fulfilling the principles of the 
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population in the democratic West has been depoliticised as the 
revolutionary and radical spirit that had inspired popular struggles in 
the past has been subdued in the prevailing consumerist democracies. 
The lament about disillusioned voters or non-voters notwithstanding, 
the bulk of the system‟s desires and energies are invested in fostering a 
managerial and technocratic rule where the population, except for 
occasional voting, leaves all matters of governance to those in power 
while indulging in a culture of consumption. We also have examples of 
democratic politicians stoking fear and anxieties of the voters by 
making immigration and multiculturalism an electoral issue. The 
emergence, rather re-emergence of far right parties such as the BNP in 
the UK and their ability to transform the political agenda by allowing 
mainstream parties to adopt the far-right vocabulary in the name of 
containing the far-right parties, scavenges upon democratic 
mechanisms but subverts the democratic ethos of pluralism and 
tolerance. 
 
This preface about the problematic association of the West and 
democracy does not imply that similar forces of depoliticisation do not 
exist in the non-West. It merely reminds us that democratisation - the 
process through which a democracy comes about and entrenches itself 
– neither natural nor inevitable but a product of love, tears, sweat and 
hard work. In fact, it is better to see it not as an end-product but a 
process through which peoples‟ participation in governing their own 
lives is affirmed. A process that is always fragile and needs to be 
guarded. A deepening of democratic consciousness, in my view, 
requires an awareness that is not exhausted by choices offered for 
capitalist consumption, or nationalist conformity since both may lead to 
the concentration of power in the hands of the few, unless the people 
are vigilant. 
Facts 
In this paper, I have chosen to structure my thinking around 
„democracy in the non-West‟, but as stated at the outset, this gesture is 
not a validation of the commonly held association of the West as the 
natural home of democracy and the non-West as having a contested 
                                                                                                                                
parliamentary democracy in their practices or operation where representative 
and linked parliamentary integrity becomes widely discussed”. 
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and varied relations with it. Categories of the West and non-West are 
not always as self-explanatory as they seem. I would defer to Derrida‟s 
formulation of the West as “the non-empirical site of a movement”. The 
West and the non-west are not so much geographical or empirical sites, 
as they are terms within a discourse. What is seen or designated as 
Western within a certain discourse, is that which is privileged (and by 
which its „other‟ is defined), is a function of power and history6.While 
critical and postcolonial scholarship, such as Edward Said‟s Orientalism, 
has gone a long way to deconstruct any notion of „the Orient‟ 
(associated with large parts of the non-West), and reveal the politics of 
cultural constructions of spatial categories, the „West‟ or even 
„democratic West‟ as a cultural category remains popular. Thus, when I 
speak of the non-West, I am trying to reclaim a certain privileged 
position in the discourse of democracy for the non-West. The non-west 
is not only that which is defined by the experiences of the west; it exists 
within and alongside the west.  
 
I have argued that the hegemony of democratic discourse is based upon 
a forgetting of its own history and politics, how it has come to be. This 
hegemony establishes itself through a particular narration of 
systematised, secularised, civic knowledge that manages to put forward 
its particularity as universalist and encourages all affected by it to re-
read and re-present their own historical and cultural specificities as 
conforming. Liberal democracy, Radical democracy, Social democracy, 
Communal democracy, Cosmopolitan democracy, Asian democracy, 
Western democracy, Sovereign democracy, Participatory democracy, 
Guided democracy, Socialist democracy, Authoritarian democracy, 
Grassroots democracy, Islamic Democracy, Secular Democracy - most 
existing systems claim to be democratic in the sense that they are 
genuine representations of the political will of its constituent people. 
But what explains the hegemony of the democratic discourse? It is not 
the worldwide acceptance of democratic political machinery, leave 
alone a celebration of democratic values. Nor is it a direct product of 
Western dominance of the international order - the possible emerging 
                                                          
6 This refers to the poststructural deconstruction of binaries; what needs to be 
seen as „outside‟ for the inside to make sense. The non-west is defined as the 
excessive „other‟ of the west. This binary structuring of discourse leaves as 
unquestioned the defining privilege of the west. 
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powers and competitors like China and Russia challenge the Western 
prerogative of dictating policies in the name of democracy promotion, 
but they do not argue for any alternative systems. In fact, the resurgent 
Russia emphasises upon Sovereign Democracy while President Hu 
Jintao‟s keynote speech to the 17th National Congress of the CPC was 
peppered with the Chinese characters for democracy (Minzhu) more 
than 60 times. It is a complex suite of external and internal factors 
which explains democracy‟s attractions, one of which is the protean 
forms it can take (many scholarly writings on democracy and 
democratisation deal with this).  
 
In the non-West, there is an important historical link democracy and 
nationalism, colonialism and imperialism. The process and project of 
nation-building in many countries in the non-west was shaped by anti-
colonial nationalisms. In India, the demands for self-rule (swaraj) did 
not necessarily need to imply rule of the people (democracy); but they 
did, and this was the reason for the strong moral force of Indian anti-
colonial nationalism, a moral force that came from the claim of 
indigenous representation. While we should be clear that colonial rule 
in any form cannot be democratic (so that an empire run by a 
democracy is as harmful as one run by old imperials), self-rule can 
equally be narrow in replacing one set of foreign elite by another set of 
indigenous elite, and without a commitment to open up the power-
sharing and governance architecture to the democratic majority. In 
early 20th century China we saw the movement for Republicanism as 
not always coincidental with a desire for rule of the people through 
elections7. Political formations emerged that claimed to embody the 
popular will either through their vanguard role in the anti-colonial 
struggle or as the sole repository of wisdom to implement collective 
sovereignty or as the clearest expression of a putative national spirit. 
The virtues of responsibilities and duties were extolled over those of 
rights and entitlements. 
                                                          
7 Notwithstanding the San-Min Zhuyi Doctrine, or the Three principles of the 
the People, developed by Sun Yat Sen/ KMT. These are Minzu, Minquan, and 
Minsheng: Nationalism, Democracy and People‟s Livelihood. For a general 
overview of the usage of concepts of republicanism and democracy in China 
over the period 1840-1924, see http://www.xschina.org/show.php?id=4927 
and http://www.xschina.org/show.php?id=4928 
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We should not underemphasise the rupture between colonial and post-
colonial rule - decolonisation is a necessary precondition for 
democratisation. A massive change in expectations that took place at 
different points in time in different countries, but became stark 
everywhere with decolonisation was to do with the question of why 
pay taxes? Revenue and tax collections in the past were payments made 
to be „left alone‟ - a farmer paid revenue to her landlord or a trader to 
the customs collector so that they be allowed to do certain things. 
However, with anti-colonial movements (the American Revolution and 
its „no taxation without representation‟ is an early example) the 
expectations of and from the state shifted. By the middle of the 20th 
century, taxes are primarily paid not only to be left alone but to 
contribute in order to secure certain rights and entitlements from the 
state. At the same time, as plethora of examples from recent history 
shows, one needs to be sceptical of an easy equation of nationalism with 
genuine expression of democratic will. Postcolonial states, for instance 
in Indonesia under Suharto, often in the name of developmentalism 
(the idea that the state exists as a developmental actor), national unity 
and anticommunism, reneged on the democratic promises of the anti-
colonial struggles and experimented with various forms of 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rules.  
 
While the evolving norms of international society, international 
organisations, transnational movements, and global civil society may 
play a vital role in fostering democracy and even supporting the 
establishment of democratic political machinery, sustainable and stable 
democracy is dependent primarily on a deepening of democratic 
consciousness and values. A democracy is a skeletal democracy when it 
claims to represent the will of the majority through its political 
apparatus but does not have the widely shared consciousness that 
Legitimate Power exists to serve the people, that in lieu of legitimacy 
transferred up, people have the right to expect the system to work for 
their collective welfare. This transfer of legitimacy to rule from the 
collective to the few representatives is like a ritual that has to be 
performed regularly. For a democracy to function as itself, the 
legitimacy has to be renewed systematically and frequently, with the 
population having the right and the capacity to change who they 
choose for representation. In this sense, a one-party state cannot be 
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truly democratic unless there are real and meaningful alternative 
choices to the voters who can exercise them without fear and 
intimidation. These empowering and legitimizing aspects explain the 
attraction of democratic ideals in the face of numerous challenges it 
faces and the real and perceived problems associated with actually-
existing democracies.  
 
Different systems will claim to better represent and embody the 
political will of the people, but they might enforce the interests of 
certain elite individuals or groups or communities as the national 
interest and the nation‟s political will. The actually-existing 
democracies are not immune from this (see Cox 2008). But at a 
conceptual level, democratic system by requiring regular renewal of 
legitimacy and by offering the people opportunities to change those 
who represent and govern them, offers the best available opportunity 
for balancing impulses of liberty and egalitarianism in a society. In 
Parliamentary democracies, the Representative body (Parliament, 
Assembly) „acts for‟ (vertreten) as well as „stands for‟ (darstellen) the 
represented; democratic institutions. Moreover - and this is relevant in 
the context of legitimate power and representation - there are many 
reasons to see a semiotic continuity between the way in which the 
transubstantiation of power takes place from a collective body to its 
mise-en-abyme, in a theological and in a democratic context. In 
symbolic terms, just as an individual might choose to place their trust in 
divine beings to whom they pray in the inner sanctum of a temple, 
undertake pilgrimages, and in whose wise judgement they trust. 
Similarly, the individual chooses to undertake the ritualistic pilgrimage 
like act of voting every few years, and in the secret and sacred privacy 
of the voting booth, they cast their opinion and live with the 
consequences. But, the mechanism of accountability, change, and 
transfer of power is what makes a democratic system different 
ultimately. I do not intend to merely emphasise the libertarian aspect of 
democracy; in fact, the conspicuous characteristic of democratic values 
for me is an egalitarian impulse. Nothing could exemplify this more 
than the act of voting - at the precise moment when an individual voter 
presses a button or ticks a box to vote, she affirms herself as equal to 
everyone else. 
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Whether a system works or not for the people is not known from how 
power and authority is gained but from how it is lost, that is, the right 
of the people to reject those who govern them without risking the 
viability of the system. In theory, the strategic advantage of democracy 
as a system lies in the division of risk, the sharing of expertise, the 
lowered constraints on optimal decision making in an environment of 
increased policy complexity. In practice, however, this could very well 
lead to a division of responsibility and the competition for alternatives 
may encourage the pursuit of populist lowest common denominators. 
Therefore, the establishment of democratic institutions should be seen 
as a test of democracy and not the victory of democracy - a test that 
requires the inculcation of certain mode of thinking and behaviour 
about legitimate power. One that sees legitimacy and power as 
requiring frequent renewal and as ultimately residing in the ruled and 
not the ruler. Without democratisation - here conceived as the process 
of infusing a strong democratic consciousness amongst all - it is easy for 
states with skeletal institutions of representative democracy to turn 
quasi-authoritarian. Installing democratic procedures and institutions 
without democratic consciousness makes the system an easier prey to 
the corrupt influence of money, muscle or religious extremism. The 
relationship between a democracy and democratic consciousness is 
complex, but ideally, the latter should precede the former (in my work, 
I take the example of a transition most familiar to me, see Kaul 2008a-d. 
Elaborate my analysis on the Bhutanese context)8. 
Fictions 
The first fiction is that which I began with: the Fiction of the Democratic 
West, its teleological origins, and its natural affinity for democracy.  
 
A related fiction is that of Export Packet of Democracy with its 
economic strings. This is a composite fiction that democracy can be 
exported in the manner of commodities, and usually is accompanied by 
the other desirables of capitalism, free market, secularism. To me, there 
is no prefigured mix of property rights, monetisation and 
commercialisation that needs to be a necessary component of 
democratic system. There are egalitarian and regressive impulses in 
                                                          
8 These remarks will draw upon a separate paper on Bhutan I have written for 
Stanford workshop on the monarchic transitions to democracy. 
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every social context and it is fallacious and detrimental to try and 
export democracy. The main problem with the notion of exporting 
democracy is that it uses the language of commodities and not of ideas. 
Ideas are fungible and contested, while commodities have a fixed 
identity. Language of „exporting democracy‟ is politicised - it assumes 
that the exporter has democracy in the first place, that it possibly has a 
surfeit of it. It ignores the main strength of democracy which is that it 
renews the legitimacy of political rule through an interaction between 
the people and their rulers they themselves elect. Democracy in this 
sense is about self-determination and the fiction of export undermines 
the self-determination aspect of democracy (see Archibugi 2009).  
 
The large literature on waves and reverse waves of democracy 
(Huntington), like that on stages of growth (Rostow), is often bolstered 
by mechanistic analyses which see countries as unified actors, and 
speciously cast historical developments in absolute terms (for an older 
comprehensive overview, see Diamond 1997). Many examples from 
around the world illustrate how democracy „exports‟ become 
heightened in line with vested interests at specific points in time9. The 
toxic geopolitical legacies of grafting and imposition of democracy in 
large parts of the non-western world have set up perverted incentives 
which will take time to undo (Coyne 2008 provides an American 
argument against such exports, for a discussion in the context of Africa, 
see Mafeje 2002)10. In the cold war years in particular, much democracy 
promotion happened without context sensitivity of goals, or economic 
and political problems of the decolonised non-west, or a basic respect 
for human life or beliefs.  
 
Another fiction is that of alluding to postcolonial or cultural difference 
as a reason for collective conformity over individual rights and to locate 
this difference in certain parts of the world. A criticism of the fiction of 
western export of democracy should not come from a native culturalist 
                                                          
9 These days, an updated discussion is that of East Asian exceptionalism (to the 
third wave of democratisation), and something at issue is the question of how 
and when overtly democratic changes will come to China, and to what extent is 
there an „authoritarian resiliency‟. See Yun-Han 2003. 
10 For more on issues of democracy in Africa, see 
http://worldviews.igc.org/awpguide/democ.html 
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position (on this, I agree wholly with Sen 2006). The arguments made, 
most often in the case of the Middle East, that certain cultures (say 
Islamic) are incompatible with democracy or human rights associated 
with it. Islam and Democracy is a thriving arena of politics as well as 
scholarship and I don‟t have the space to go into it here. All I‟d like to 
say is that cultures are not a stagnant product, cultures are organic and 
ever evolving, cultures are arenas of contestation and debate. If Islam 
and democracy were really incompatible, how does one explain 
thriving experiments with democratisation in Indonesia, Turkey or Iran 
but not in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait?  
 
We saw this also with the debate over the so-called „Asian values‟ 
where a certain discourse of conformity was prized over critical 
questioning. Without going into the conceptual, empirical and ethical 
dubiousness of such attempts (for critiques, see Lawson 1995, Tatsuo 
1999), we need to recognise that individuals and differences do matter 
in a democracy. While one can agree with former PM of Malaysia 
Mahathir‟s exasperation at Western modes of democracy promotion 
(„But is there only one form of democracy or only one high priest to 
interpret it?‟ - in Esposito and Voll 1996: 141), subsequent developments 
in Malaysia show how serious discriminations along religious, ethnic 
and individual lines get papered over in the name of community 
oriented democracy. Without fetishising either the sovereign 
individuals or the collective, there is the need for a democratic 
consciousness that guards against such forcible imposition of 
conformity in the name of culture, tradition or even nationalism. One 
that defends the rights of the Self as well as of the Others to be. It is easy 
to talk of a harmonious collective if one ignores individuals - it is more 
difficult but also more productive to construct a system that brings 
together a collective without suppressing the individuals.  
Frictions 
As I have argued elsewhere (Kaul 2009), being a democracy means a 
commitment to freedom of expression, but it also involves a certain 
level of commitment to individualism. Democracies reconcile values: 
procedurally, by elections and elaborate governance mechanisms 
through which administrative power can operate, and substantially, by 
facilitating discussion and allowing for individuals to have their say in 
the system. Post-colonial non-western democracies have had to define 
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the appropriate individual rights along with simultaneously structuring 
the expectations of a new people-state relationship. For instance, when 
India became free at the proverbial stroke of midnight in 1947, there 
was a desire to define its purity in opposition to the moral decadence of 
the colonising West. The postcolonial entity India, created with a 
rupture and greeted with rapture, sought to create unity in diversity by 
appealing to a sense of civic morality springing from emergent 
nationalism. But this civic ethic in India did not evolve alongside the 
coming-into-being of democratic principles at the level of the nation-
state (unlike England, for example, where the two grew together). 
Democracy in India had to shoulder a greater responsibility (and this it 
is still remarkable) in bringing people and their conflicting views 
together. To put it simply, unlike places where the relationship between 
people and state and between people and people co-evolved over long 
runs of time, in postcolonial India, the relationship between people and 
state had to itself be the basis for developing the relationship between 
people and people. In such a scenario, when people feel disappointed in 
the expectations of their hierarchical relationship with the state, they try 
to forcibly replicate their values in the civic domain, and the people to 
people relationship becomes the target of a violence which is 
legitimised by claims to preservation of culture.  
 
Democratic systems in the non-West face a number of challenges and a 
deepening of democratic system will require addressing these frictions. 
The list here is indicative and not exhaustive, and wherever possible I 
highlight examples of ways forward.  
 
Many countries face the issue of indigeneity in one or another form. To 
the extent that this is a population group or demographic issue, it can 
partly be addressed over time by democratic change that gives a voice 
to indigenous groups (for example, the case of Shigeru Kayano, the 
Ainu leader in Japan). However, indigeneity is also about a way of life. 
Unlike the earlier pogroms of extermination that decimated the naive 
Americans, the aboriginal Australians, and many others, the question 
now is how to harmonise the desires and interests of disparate 
collectives of people, sometimes with irreconcilable worldviews? For 
instance, while for the modernist technocratic mindset, land is a 
resource available for exploitation, for many indigenous, tribal and 
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traditional communities land is not only a source of life and livelihood 
but also sacred. Struggles over land and environment, for instance in 
parts of India, is one of two different modes of being. One that has the 
weight of Science, Technology, Enlightenment, Market, and 
Developmental State behind it. On the other side of this rule by 
metaphors, there is the other argument which has the prior claims of 
history, tradition and sacrality of their lived environment. In this 
struggle between the People (represented by the elected government) 
and the Peoples (those who may be part of the electorate but see their 
primary identity as that of a distinct indigenous community), 
democracy faces a vital test. One interesting step11 is that taken recently 
by Ecuador whose Constitution has a Rights of Nature (RoN) provision, 
so that nature is given legal rights and “any Ecuadorian citizen is now 
entitled to represent nature in a court of law in a defense of bio-
integrity and a redefinition of wealth away from capital accumulation 
and towards bio-capital protection” (Hilton 2009, also Loudis 2008). 
 
Then, there are the challenges posed by the need for international co-
operation in the face of the global public goods (GPGs) provision. 
Moreover, the notion of „contested commons‟, or strategic frontier zones 
such as air, sea, cyberspace are increasingly transforming the role and 
reach of the democratic state itself (see Sullivan and Elkus 2009). 
Domestically too, the questions of striking the right balance between 
environmental preservation and economic development (delivery of 
services, access to resources) become even more acute for non western 
democracies that often need to build appropriate long term domestic 
consensus on policy issues amid technological constraints and relative 
capital scarcity (see Lijphart 1999). The role of non state actors (NSAs) is 
an important one in deepening democracy and giving voice to those 
who may not necessarily be heard within the cacophony of politics. 
However, they are not elected or representative. Big powerful NGOs, 
especially when having access to foreign funding in otherwise poor 
developing countries, may distort democratic politics. These include 
secular developmental NGOs as well as religious organisations. The 
debate in Bangladesh over the influence on democratic politics of 
                                                          
11 There are other precursors of innovative approaches to community 
development, such as Timothy Kennedy‟s SkyRiver project which enabled a 
form of communication between remote native Alaskan villages. 
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developmental, often secular, NGOs as well as religious networks 
funded through money from countries such as Saudi Arabia is a case in 
point. A democratic system, unless checked by democratic 
consciousness, creates incentives for political contestants to focus on 
short-term private gains. Based on electoral calculations, especially in a 
system where Simple Majority is required and there are many 
candidates, politicians may invest more energy and resources in 
securing a cohort of assured voters than in promising change for 
everyone. In a society where identity politics along confessional, ethnic 
or sectarian lines, play an important role, we often find a spectrum 
ranging from outright violence between communities (recent reports 
tell us that Kikuyu and Kalenjin Kenyans are arming themselves for the 
2012 elections, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8293745.stm - a 
clear case for the significance of „rule of law‟ to democratic processes) to 
politicians subtly playing vote bank politics. While beneficial to 
individual politicians and parties, vote bank politics is undemocratic for 
various reasons - it creates and reifies fissures in society; it takes the 
agency away from individuals and invests them in communities; it 
transforms, through recognition and competition, a fluid fuzzy 
community into a fixed one. As we have seen in India for instance, vote 
bank politics have led to various types of minority-isms as well as 
majority-isms, both detrimental to democratic politics.   
 
When majoritarian rightwing nationalists argue that the majority 
identity group must have dominance in governance, they conflate 
political majority with cultural majority. The idea of political majority is 
fundamentally based on individual‟s choice in every election, while 
cultural majority is one that is based on communal politics. A healthy 
democracy is based on political majorities, people can change who they 
vote for and should not be subsumed under their cultural identity.  
 
Faith and religion can be a source for aligning people‟s cultural values 
with the political system (see Gillespie 2008 for an argument about the 
theological origins of western modernity). For instance, one may argue 
that Islamic notion of Shura (translated as consultation, deliberation), 
rather than a liberal secular democracy, offers a way of reconciling 
democratic values with faith in Islamic societies. Or that faith-inspired 
notion of morality, community and compassion can make a democracy 
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more humane. But in a pluralist society, and most societies in the world 
are pluralist in one or the other form, democratic system has to ensure 
that is not dominated by only one set of values alone. Who takes the 
role of interpreting what the religion says? How can different faith-
based values, be reconciled? How can one ensure that the tolerance, 
compassion and understanding aspects of a religion is „allowed in‟ 
while intolerance, chauvinism or sectarianism is „kept out‟? Each 
democracy has to have its own debate on how to reconcile traditions, 
religious values, modernities, and differences. Bhutan is an excellent 
example of such a faith-based translation during the democratic 
transition.  
 
Another crucial role is that of the educated elite12 and the unelected 
wings of the government. Powerful civilian, military and intelligence 
bureaucracies have to be under strict control of the democratically 
elected government in order for democracy to be sustainable. As 
examples from Pakistan and from many other non-Western states 
show, democracy is fragile and prone to coups, interference and 
distortions. The vigilance against the dominance by unelected 
bureaucracies is required not only in new but also in established 
democracies. Note how a main plank of the victorious Democratic Party 
of Japan in 2009 was to tackle head-on the powerful bureaucracies. 
While elite rule may be more „efficient‟ in dealing with a developing 
societies‟ problems, it cannot be acknowledged as authentically 
representative of people‟s desire. See Chua (2004) for a discussion of the 
Singaporean experiment with „guided democracy‟; a communitarianism 
without competitive politics.  
 
While a positive nationalism - one that cultivates a sense of unity and 
harnesses peoples and communities‟ creative energies toward mutually 
agreed goals without suppressing their plurality - can consolidate 
democratisation, a negative nationalism - one that promotes 
xenophobic patriotism, instils a sense of pride in the Self by denigrating 
                                                          
12 The educated elite in non western states - democratic or not - often has 
remarkably similar life pathways (institutional interaction and sociocultural 
encounters dictated by the sociological advantages of price discrimination), 
which may have the effect of insulating them from the real problems in their 
own societies. 
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others - has to be watched out for. The process of enemy-creation in 
politics is based on an intolerance that can easily be misused by the 
political elite to suppress dissent, individuals and groups all in the 
name of national unity within the country and even wage wars with the 
neighbours deemed as enemy. Wars and violence are corrosive of 
democratisation; in fact, they epitomise a failure of democratic values.  
 
Even a one-party dominant state, unless checked by a thriving internal 
party democracy, a responsible but free media, an effective opposition, 
and a strong democratic consciousness in the wider population, can 
acquire powers to limit the democratic options for the people.  
 
Finally, a remark about the culture of accommodation. As I have said 
before, the true test of a democratic system is not in how power is won 
but how it is lost. If the losers have strong doubts about the fairness of 
the electoral outcomes and feel that their only recourse is through 
protests, civic struggles and even violence, democracy is indeed weak. 
An independent body to plan, conduct and oversee elections is an 
important benchmark for a consolidated democracy (see Trebilcock and 
Chitalkar 2009). As the recent examples from Iran, Kenya, Mongolia, 
and Afghanistan show, where there is a lack of faith in the election 
body‟s neutrality and a strong suspicion of ruling party‟s manipulation, 
people‟s faith in the legitimacy of the government as well as the system 
is eroded. Democratic system per se offers no blueprint for stability. In 
fact, it often leads to an exaggeration of differences and rivalries and 
encourages a bitter struggle for power, thus leading to a 
disenchantment with the system amongst people. It is a democratic 
consciousness within the population as well as the rulers that deepens 
democratic system and makes it sustainable. It is as much the people‟s 
responsibility as it is the political class‟s duty to nurture and foster this 
consciousness. 
Conclusion 
Democratisation requires constant dialogue and exchange as well as 
continual imaginations, revisionings and translations of visions of a 
good society. This hard work of democratisation should not stop at the 
national boundary. Issues of justice, equality, and fairness do not get 
contained within bounded communities that are the present-day 
sovereign states. Democratic consciousness is about rights of „I‟, „You‟ 
                                Democracy in the Non-West: Facts, Fictions and Frictions 
 131 
and „Us‟ and a recognition that there is no moral justification behind the 
selective sympathy only for „our kind‟ and its corollary of 
dehumanisation of „other kinds‟. The exclusive focus on I may lead to 
anomie, corruption, blindness to daily sufferings brought on the many 
by economic violence, in short, a lack of care for the not-Is. The 
privileging of „Us‟ may contribute to the promotion of narrow sectional 
and parochial interests, and to sectarian and confessional violence, and 
to nationalist xenophobia. While democracy can and should be a mix of 
local grassroots empowerment and nation-building, it is the means to 
an end, that of world-building. One can only hope that the ends we are 
working toward is one of a democratic consciousness, compassion and 
humanity. 
 
A democratic consciousness is one that accepts and celebrates the 
categories „people‟ as well as the „political will‟ as dynamic, always 
changing and often contested. Difference is not feared nor merely 
depoliticised and celebrated as a curio, but it is accepted as a fact of life 
which has to be accommodated into the political system. Dissent and 
constant questioning are not only tolerated but built into the evolving 
political culture. The health of a democracy comes from how differences 
are deal with and not by how sameness is imposed. It is a far more 
difficult responsibility to be a democrat than an autocrat or a 
technocrat. The exact mechanisms to incorporate differences and 
change within the system will depend on the context. Countries may 
learn about institutions for procedural democracy from each other, but 
as for the democratic consciousness, there can be no blueprint, only 
footprints.  
References 
Archibugi, Daniele (2009). “Democracy for Export: Principles, Practices, 
Lessons”, 5 March, Open Democracy net. 
Bernal, Martin (1987). Black Athena: The Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical 
Civilisation. Rutgers University Press. 
Chua, Beng Huat (2004) (eds.). Communitarian Politics in Asia. 
Routledge. 
Cox, David (2008). “The Democratic Deficit”,  The Guardian, 8 January. 
Coyne, Christopher J. (2007) “Can We Export Democracy?” Cato Policy 
Report, Jan-Feb, 11-13. 
Beyond the Ballot Box 
 132 
Davis, William L. and Figgins, Bob (2009). “Do Economists Believe 
American Democracy Is Working?”, Econ Journal Watch, 6 (2): 195-
202. 
Diamond, Larry (1997). “Is the Third Wave of Democratisation Over? 
An Empirical Assessment”, Working Paper 236, March. 
Esposito, John and Voll, John (1996) (eds). Islam and Democracy. Oxford 
University Press. 
Gillespie, Michael Allen (2008). The Theological Origins of Modernity. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Hilton, Isabel (2009). “For democracy to Flourish, it has to be a Culture 
as well as a Process”, 15 May, Open Democracy net. 
Kaul, Nitasha (2008a). “Monarchies in Transition in Asia”, paper 
presented at Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law 
(CDDRL), Stanford University, 5-6 June. 
______ (2008b) “Power to the People”, The CSD Bulletin, 15 (2), Summer 
Issue, pp. 1-2, 20 
______ (2008c). “Bhutan is neither Authoritarian nor Stuck in a Time 
Warp”, The Guardian, 27 March. 
______ (2008d). “Democracy is all you Need?”, The Edinburgh Journal, 24 
April. 
______ (2009). “Wine, Women, Valentine: Moral Policing in India”, 
Outlook Magazine online, 13 February 
Keane, John (2009). The Life and Death of Democracy. Simon and Schuster. 
Kennedy, Timothy (2009). Where the Rivers Meet the Sky: A Collaborative 
Approach to Participatory Development. University of Alaska Press. 
Lawson, Stephanie (1995). “Culture, Relativism and Democracy: 
Political Myths About „Asia‟ and the „West‟ ”, Working paper, ANU. 
Lijphart, Arend (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and 
Performance in 36 Countries. Yale University Press. 
Loudis, Jessica (2008). “The „Rights of Nature‟ ”, 8 December, Open 
Democracy net. 
Mafeje, Archie (2002). “Democratic Governance and New Democracy in 
Africa: Agenda for the Future”, paper at African Forum for 
Envisioning Africa, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Rosato, Sebastian (2003). “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace 
Theory”, American Political Science Review, 97 (4): 585-602.  
Said, Edward (1979). Orientalism. Vintage. 
                                Democracy in the Non-West: Facts, Fictions and Frictions 
 133 
Sen, Amartya (2006). “Democracy isn‟t Western”, Wall Street Journal 
Online, 24 March. 
Sullivan and Elkus (2009). “Security in the Network-State”, 6 October, 
Open Democracy net. 
Tatsuo, Inoue (1999). “Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism”, in 
Joanne Bauer and Daniel Bell (eds) The East Asian Challenge for 
Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, 27-59. 
Trebilcock, Michael and Chitalkar, Poorvi (2009). “From Nominal to 
Substantive Democracy: The Role and Design of Election 
Management Bodies”, The Law and Development Review, 2 (1): 190-
224. 
Yun-Han, Chu (2006) “Third-Wave Democratisation in East Asia: 
Challenges and Prospect”, ASIEN 100, July, 11-17. 
 
